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INTRODUCTION
By denying certiorari in Tuaua v. United States,1 the U.S. Supreme Court de-
clined to resolve the question whether the Constitution confers birthright citizenship on
persons born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in its unincorporated
territories.2 Many believe that the question presents a fundamental conflict between
individual rights and collective self-determination.3 Denying birthright constitutional
citizenship discriminates against those born in unincorporated territories. It leaves
their nationality to the grace of Congress, which can impose conditions precedent and
subsequent to their attaining and retaining U.S. nationality.4 It extends the racist
foundation of the Insular Cases5 beyond their express holdings.6 In particular, it dis-
criminates against persons born in American Samoa who receive only non-citizen-
ship nationality under federal statutory law, an intermediate status between citizens
and aliens.7 Even when residing in one of the fifty states, they cannot serve as Rep-
resentatives or Senators; they cannot serve as officers in the armed forces or in many
federal jobs, including in the federal judiciary; and in many states, they cannot vote,
* Member, New York State Bar. Thanks to the staff at the William & Mary Bill of Rights
Journal for their editorial assistance.
1 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (denying birthright constitutional citizenship to persons
born in American Samoa), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2461 (2016).
2 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, 2–14, Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 300, No. 15-981 [here-
inafter Pet. for Cert.]; see also American Samoa and the Citizenship Clause: A Study in Insular
Cases Revisionism, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1683, 1685–86, 1702 (2017) [hereinafter Study].
3 Study, supra note 2, at 1685.
4 See, e.g., Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (upholding congressional authority to
impose conditions subsequent on statutory citizenship conferred outside of the United States);
Lisa Maria Perez, Note, Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases and the Fourteenth Amendment,
94 VA. L. REV. 1029, 1068–71 (2008) (noting Justice Blackmun’s holding in Rogers “that the
statutory citizenship of persons born abroad to U.S. citizen parents is not fundamentally ir-
revocable and may be conditioned by Congress”).
5 For a summary of the Insular Cases prepared by the Editors, see the Appendix to this
Article.
6 See Study, supra note 2, at 1693–94.
7 See Rose Cuison Villazor, American Nationals and Interstitial Citizenship, 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1673, 1676 (2017); see also Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(a)(29), 308(1)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(29), 1408(1)).
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bear arms, or hold public office or public-service positions.8 On the other hand,
some fear that acknowledging birthright constitutional citizenship in unincorporated
territories could undermine their self-determination by tightening equal protection
constraints on their local governments.9
This Article argues that there is no fundamental conflict between birthright
citizenship and self-government in unincorporated territories. English common law
embodied in the original Constitution confers birthright citizenship and permits self-
government there.10 England recognized the common-law rule knowing that it applied
in remote territories and to “people not only alterius soli, but alterius coeli.”11 The
extent to which American equal protection doctrine constrains local governments
in unincorporated territories is a separate constitutional issue.
This Article also shows that shortly after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress recognized that the common-law rule applied in the Oregon
Country during its joint occupation with Britain, when it was self-governing and
unincorporated under the later-invented standards of the Insular Cases.12 It was
Oregon, not the territories acquired from Spain in 1898, that first required the United
States to confront the limits of congressional authority over territories and to de-
termine whether the nation would become a colonial power.13 Congress abjured
colonialism and permitted self-government in the Oregon Country only to embrace
colonialism later in the insular territories. This Article concludes by suggesting that
the Oregon precedent of organic self-government combined with birthright Ameri-
can citizenship provides a model for self-governing territories that are affiliated
with the United States but are neither states nor colonies.
Part I details the common-law rule of birthright citizenship and its application
in unincorporated territories. Part II responds to the principal arguments against recog-
nizing birthright citizenship there. Parts III to V present a short history of the Oregon
Country, a federal district court decision finding that the Fourteenth Amendment
is merely declaratory of the common-law rule that applied in Oregon in 1824, and
Congress’s 1872 confirmation that the rule applied there during its joint occupation
from 1818 to 1846. Parts VI and VII show that the Oregon Country was unincorpo-
rated and explain why it, rather than the insular territories, first required Congress
to confront the limits of its territorial authority and whether to become a colonial power.
This Article concludes that the Oregon experience and the American application of
8 See Pet. for Cert., supra note 2, at 10–11.
9 See Study, supra note 2, at 1685.
10 Id. at 1696, 1698–99.
11 15 FRANCIS BACON, THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 218 (James Spedding et al., eds.,
1864).
12 See Appendix.
13 See Oregon History: Territorial Government, OR. SEC’Y ST., https://sos.oregon.gov
/blue-book/Pages/facts/history/pre-territorial.aspx [https://perma.cc/U6PX-HDRP] (last visited
Nov. 29, 2018).
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the common-law rule of birthright citizenship allow a flexible combination of
organic self-government and birthright American citizenship in U.S. territories.
I. THE COMMON LAW AND CALVIN’S CASE
The English common law provides the constitutional rule of birthright citizen-
ship.14 The common-law rule is the jus soli (right of soil): natural-born subjects
were those born within the dominions and ligeance of the King, consistent with the
1608 English decision in Calvin’s Case.15 Only two classes of persons born within
the King’s dominions were born without his ligeance: those of foreign ambassadors,
and those of hostile foreign occupying forces.16 Only one class of persons born without
the King’s dominions were his natural born subjects: those of English ambassadors.17
The background, arguments and decision in Calvin’s Case are useful for understand-
ing why the right of soil applies in unincorporated territories.
14 See Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 660 (1927); United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167–68 (1875).
15 Calvin’s Case (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377; 7 Co. Rep. 1a. See also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *357; Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship
in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 74 (1997).
16 See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 657; U.K. GOV’T, British Nationality: Summary
§ 1.3.1, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267
913/britnatsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7A3-MYCD]. The U.K. government website does
not identify the author of the summary, but the U.K. Home Office confirmed to the author that
the summary reflects its understanding of the law.
17 See 12 Journal of the House of Lords: 1666–1675, at 86 (London, 1767–1830),
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol12/pp86-87 [https://perma.cc/BY2C-R8CF];
BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 361; LAURIE FRANSMAN, FRANSMAN’S BRITISH NATIONALITY
LAW 131 (3d ed. 2011). Foreign-born children of English parents in other crown service, such
as serving soldiers, were not natural born. See De Geer v. Stone (1882) 22 Ch. D. 243 (Eng.)
(rejecting arguments that the ambassador rule applied to serving soldiers and that British deriva-
tive nationality statutes were declaratory of the common law); FRANSMAN, supra, at 132–33.
Cf. An Act for the making free and to putt in the nature of mere Englisshmen certayne children
begotten and born byyonde the Sea, (1541) 33 Hen. 8 c.25 (naturalizing, among others, the
foreign-born child of an aide to Henry VIII who had gone beyond the sea “about the Kyng’s
affayres”). The scope of the ambassador rule is uncertain. John Adams interpreted it to include
children of the ambassador, of his family, and of any of his country men and women attached
to the embassy. See Letter from John Adams to William Steuben Smith, NAT’L ARCHIVES
(May 30, 1815), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-03-02-2874 [https://perma
.cc/PU75-TMQM]. This Article refers to the ambassador generally without taking a position
on the exception’s scope. Some consider children born on British ships to be natural born at
common law. See FRANSMAN, supra, at 131. It is generally assumed that foreign-born children
of the English monarch were also natural born subjects, likely because of a fourteenth-century
statute declaring that they could inherit at common law. See U.K. GOV’T, British Nationality:
Summary, supra note 16, at § 1.4.1; De natis ultra mare [Status of Children Born Abroad Act],
1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 2, cl. 3.
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In 1603, the English crown descended to James VI of Scotland upon the death
of Elizabeth.18 The descent united the crowns of England and Scotland in the natural
person of James without uniting the two kingdoms.19 Each retained its political inde-
pendence, laws and parliament.20 The union of the crowns raised an important question
decided in 1608 by all the judges of England in Calvin’s Case: whether those born
in Scotland after the descent were natural born subjects in England at common law
because they owed allegiance to the natural body of James, the King of both king-
doms, or instead were aliens because they owed allegiance to the politic body of James
VI, King of Scotland, rather than the politic body of James I, King of England.21
All agreed that any person born within the English King’s dominions and ligeance
was a natural born subject in all of those dominions if the King had acquired them
by conquest or discovery.22 This included dominions acquired by conquest and
governed by separate laws, such as Ireland.23 Even “while the realm of England and
that of Ireland were governed by several laws, any that was born in Ireland was no
alien to the realm of England.”24
Calvin’s Case was only contentious because England had not acquired Scotland
by conquest or discovery.25 Scotland remained an independent kingdom united with
England only through their peoples’ shared natural allegiance to King James.26 There-
fore, the case required the judges to address the distinction between the monarch’s
acquisition of a politically independent dominion by descent, and England’s acquisition
of a subordinate dominion by conquest or discovery.27
Many English objected to interpreting the common-law rule broadly to make
anyone born in a dominion acquired by descent a natural-born subject in all of the
King’s dominions.28 Some objected because the interpretation could not be restricted
to Scots, a “people of the same island and language,”29 but would necessarily apply
throughout the world “to persons every way more estranged from us than they
18 See Price, supra note 15, at 80.
19 See Calvin’s Case (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 394; 7 Co. Rep. 15a; Price, supra note 15, at 80
n.28 (“It was a strictly dynastic, regal, and personal union, not an incorporating union of the
two kingdoms.” (quoting BRIAN LEVACK, THE FORMATION OF THE BRITISH STATE, 1603–1707
1 (1987))).
20 Calvin’s Case (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 394; 7 Co. Rep. 15a. See also Price, supra note
15, at 80.
21 See Price, supra note 15, at 103.
22 See BACON, supra note 11, at 219 (Lord Bacon arguing as counsel for Calvin).
23 See id. at 220–21.
24 Calvin’s Case (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398; 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 17b.
25 See Price, supra note 15, at 80–86 (discussing the Calvin and Colville cases as a means
of discussing, in the English courts, what Parliament had fully debated in 1604—whether Scots
were aliens or subjects in England).
26 See id. at 80, 80 n.28, 82.
27 See BACON, supra note 11, at 219.
28 Id. at 218.
29 Id.
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are;”30 so that, for example, “if in future time, in the king’s descendants, there should
be a match with Spain, and the dominions of Spain should be united with the crown
of England,”31 those born afterward in the West Indies would be natural born subjects
in England even though they “are people not only alterius soli, but alterius coeli.”32
Lord Bacon argued in response that this objection was political, not legal.33 If
descent united the English and Spanish crowns, West Indian post-nati would be
natural-born subjects in England.34 If that were to become a political problem,
England could readily solve it “when the case comes; for we can make an act of
parliament of separation if we like not their consort.”35
Others stated a variety of objections that were also political rather than legal.
Some objected that the broad interpretation would lead to an influx of Scots and
“the impoverishing of this realm of England in wealth.”36 Others objected that the
interpretation would disrupt the governments of each of the separate dominions. Sir
Edwyn Sandes, for example, warned that “[t]his case may give a dangerous example
for . . . all nations that hereafter may fall into the subjection of the king, although
they be very remote, in that their mutual commonality of privileges may disorder the
settled government of every of the particulars[.]”37 Although he denied that post-nati
Scots were natural-born subjects in England at common law, Sandes nevertheless
believed that they should hold an intermediate position because of their joint subjec-
tion to a single King: “the Scots should not be accounted nor deal[t] withall by our
lawes, as aliens, although not enabled to the full rights of Englishmen born amongst
us.”38 Finally, others objected because territory united by descent could easily
separate by descent if the King’s line failed, unlike territory acquired by conquest.39
The judges in Calvin’s Case rejected all of these objections and held that anyone
born under the ligeance of the King in any of his dominions was natural-born in all
of them.40 Lord Ellesmere explained that the laws of each dominion differed,41 and
the King was required to govern each according to its own laws, yet a subject born
in any dominion was entitled to the same rights and privileges in any other as were
subjects born there:
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 218–19.
34 See id. at 218.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr. 560,
564. Sandes made this objection when Parliament debated a proposal to declare the common
law on point. See id. at 562–63.
38 Id. at 564.
39 BACON, supra note 11, at 222–23.
40 See Calvin’s Case (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 399–400; 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 18a–18b.
41 See Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England (1608), 2 How. St. Tr.
560, 684.
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[W]here there is but one sovereign, all his subjects born in all
his dominions be born ad fidem regis; and are bound to him by
one bond of faith and allegiance: and in that, one is not greater
nor lesser than another: nor one to be preferred before another,
but all to be obedient alike; and to be ruled alike; yet under
several laws and customs.42
The United States inherited Calvin’s Case and the common-law rule.43 The
Founders understood and relied on the common-law rule and Calvin’s Case both to
define alienage and to justify colonial independence from Parliament’s authority.44
Further, they recognized that the rule gave anyone born a subject in one dominion
the rights of a natural-born subject in all of the others. As John Adams quoted from
Coke’s report of the case in 1775, “the allegiance of the King extending to both, his
birthright shall extend to both”45 and as “his kingly power extendeth to diverse
nations and kingdoms, . . . any one of the people coming into the other, is to have
the benefit of the laws, wheresoever he cometh[.]”46 Thomas Jefferson likewise
wrote in 1779 that “during the connection which subsisted between the now United
states of America and the other parts of the British empire, and their subjection to
one common prince the inhabitants of either part had all the rights of natural born
subjects in the other[.]”47 Adams even pointed out the reciprocal operation of the
42 Id. (Lord Ellesmere) (spelling modernized).
43 Price, supra note 15, at 74. See also Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 660 (1927)
(explaining the common-law rule in both England and the United States); United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 659 (1898) (noting the English rule of “citizenship by birth”
under colonial law (citing Inglis v. Trs. of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 126 (1830)));
Inglis, 28 U.S. at 126 (applying the common-law rule to birth during the Revolutionary War);
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 119–20 (1804) (explaining that a person born
in Connecticut before the Revolution who moved abroad after Independence was a United
States citizen absent an expatriating event).
44 See, e.g., John Adams, VII. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay,
NAT’L ARCHIVES (Mar. 6, 1775), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-02-02-00
72-0008 [https://perma.cc/637T-BSL5] [hereinafter Adams, VII] (arguing, based on Calvin’s
Case, that Parliament did not have “supreme power” over America); Alexander Hamilton, The
Farmer Refuted, &c., NAT’L ARCHIVES (Feb. 23, 1775), http://founders.archives.gov/documents
/Hamilton/01-01-02-0057 (explaining that Calvin’s Case justifies American colonies’ inde-
pendence from Parliament’s authority); Thomas Jefferson, Notes on British and American
Alienage, NAT’L ARCHIVES (1783), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-06
-02-0346 [https://perma.cc/633D-KG55] (citing to Coke’s report of Calvin’s Case).
45 John Adams, IX. To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, NAT’L AR-
CHIVES (Mar. 27, 1775), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-02-02-0072-0011
[hereinafter Adams, IX].
46 Id.
47 Thomas Jefferson, Bill concerning Escheats and Forfeitures from British Subjects,
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common-law rule for the Founders’ own English forbears: “our ancestors, most of
whom were post nati, born after the union of the two crowns, and consequently, as was
adjudged in Calvin’s case, free natural subjects of Scotland, as well as England[.]”48
Consequently, anyone born within the dominions and under the allegiance of
the United States is a natural-born citizen under the original Constitution.49 The
Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause is merely declaratory of the common-
law rule.50 Its qualifier “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” means “within the al-
legiance” thereof;51 it merely “exclude[s], by the fewest and fittest words” the three
classes of children born in the United States who do not receive natural-born
citizenship: two from the common law (“children born of alien enemies in hostile
occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State”)52 and one
from American law (“children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a pe-
culiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law”)53 who
are considered to owe primary allegiance to their own sovereigns rather than to the
United States.54 The qualifier does not use “jurisdiction” to refer to the reach of
general federal law.55
Unincorporated territories are sovereign territory of, and only of, the United
States.56 They, like the fifty states, are within the dominions of the United States.
NAT’L ARCHIVES (June 4, 1779), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02
-0115 [https://perma.cc/FB7H-89R5]. Whether the colonists were natural born subjects at
common law or acquired their status by other means such as charters was a matter of dispute.
See John Vlahoplus, On the Meaning of “Considered as Natural Born,” WAKE FOREST L.
REV. ONLINE (Apr. 5, 2017), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2017/04/on-the-meaning-of
-considered-as-natural-born/ [https://perma.cc/2YPU-PVAC].
48 Adams, VII, supra note 44.
49 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898) (explaining that the Four-
teenth Amendment is declaratory of original constitutional law); Mary Brigid McManamon,
The Natural Born Citizen Clause as Originally Understood, 64 CATH. U.L. REV. 317, 331
(2015) (noting the interpretation of James Kent, nineteenth-century Chancellor of New York,
of the Natural Born Citizen Clause of Article II).
50 See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 676.
51 Id. at 655 (“[W]ithin the allegiance . . . or, as would be said at this day, within the
jurisdiction . . . .”).
52 Id. at 682.
53 Id. The Court was interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which it recognized was
declaratory of the common law. See id. at 676.
54 See id. at 681–82. The Court was interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which it
recognized was declaratory of the common law. See id. at 676. 
55 See id. (referring to Justice Matthew’s interpretation that the common law of England
was adopted, applied, and altered by the State (citing Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 478, 478
(1885))).
56 See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2016) (“U.S. territories . . . are
not sovereigns distinct from the United States.”). The former rulers of the islands of American
Samoa expressly ceded sovereignty to the United States. See Cession of Tutuila and Aunu’u,
AM. BAR ASS’N SAMOA (Apr. 17, 1900), http://www.asbar.org/index.php?option=com_con
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Therefore, everyone born within them is a birthright citizen under the common-law
rule incorporated in the original Constitution, except those born to foreign ambassa-
dors, to hostile foreign occupiers, or under Native American allegiance.57
Natural-born American citizenship shares one feature with common-law natural-
born English nationality: it is unconditional.58 However, natural-born American
citizenship differs in an important respect. The common-law rule granted natural
born subjects the equivalent of broad equal protection rights in all of the King’s
dominions.59 As Adams wrote, “any one of the people coming into the other, is to
have the benefit of the laws, wheresoever he cometh[.]”60 The U.S. Constitution, on
the other hand, imposes a narrower obligation of equal protection on states (through
the Fourteenth Amendment) and the federal government (through the Fifth Amend-
ment’s incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment).61 States and the federal gov-
ernment must provide this narrower equal protection of the laws to American
citizens born in unincorporated territories.
However, the Constitution does not expressly impose the same obligation on
territorial governments.62 If unincorporated territories govern by their own right rather
than through a delegation of authority from the federal government, their obligation
to provide equal protection to citizens from other parts of the United States or to
follow other constitutional limitations is open to debate.63 As discussed further below,
the Oregon Country governed itself without any delegation of authority from Con-
gress, and there is no evidence that Congress or the courts demanded its compliance
with constitutional requirements.
tent&view=article&id=1950&Itemid=184 [https://perma.cc/8HVE-QT35]; Cession of Manu’a
Islands, AM. BAR ASS’N SAMOA (July 14, 1904), http://www.asbar.org/index.php?option
=com_content&view=article&id=1951&Itemid=185 [https://perma.cc/69S8-2TR9].
57 See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655, 664–65, 676, 680–81.
58 See, e.g., Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 834–35 (1971) (citizenship from birth within
the United States is unconditional); 1 EDW. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 129
(1628) (explaining naturalization makes one like a natural born subject, and naturalization
on a condition is inconsistent with “the absolutenesse, puritie, and indelibilitie of naturall
Allegeance”), https.//hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32437121663617.
59 See Adams, IX, supra note 45.
60 See Adams, VII, supra note 44.
61 See Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-
Determination, 135 U. PENN. L. REV. 261, 276–77 (1987).
62 Alan Tauber, The Empire Forgotten: The Application of the Bill of Rights to U.S.
Territories, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 147, 158 (2006) (“Simply stated, the [Territorial In-
corporation Doctrine] holds that the Constitution has full force and effect in incorporated
territories; while in unincorporated territories, the Constitution does not fully apply.”). See
also Neuman, supra note 61, at 261 (“The Supreme Court disposed of many claims of dis-
crimination by flatly denying that territorial classifications are subject to equal protection
scrutiny at all.”).
63 See Tauber, supra note 62, at 158 (arguing that if the full Constitution does not apply
to U.S. territories, the full protection of the Bill of Rights does not apply either).
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II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP IN
UNINCORPORATED TERRITORIES
Despite the breadth of the common-law rule, many argue that the Constitution
does not confer birthright citizenship in unincorporated territories.64 Most of the
principal arguments were raised in England and rejected by the judges in Calvin’s
Case.65 The remainder are inconsistent with either the common-law rule or Ameri-
can legal precedent.66
The first argument is that the common-law rule cannot apply in unincorporated
territories because it would grant citizenship to unfit and uncivilized post-nati in
territories acquired from Spain in 1898.67 Besides being racist,68 this objection fails
because it is political, not legal. The English judges decided Calvin’s Case knowing
that their interpretation of the common-law rule applied to “people not only alterius
soli, but alterius coeli.”69 If this becomes an insurmountable political problem for
the United States and its territories (such as the former Spanish West Indies territory
of Puerto Rico), the solution is simple: separation.70
The second argument is that the power to conquer or to discover and occupy
territories implies congressional authority to deny their post-nati natural-born
citizenship in order to protect the birthright of existing American citizens.71 This
argument fails because the common-law rule applied in conquered territories even
before the decision in Calvin’s Case, and because the judges in that case rejected
the argument that the rule should be interpreted more narrowly to protect the
English against an influx of Scots.72
The third argument is that common birthright citizenship could adversely affect
a territory’s exercise of self-government.73 This fails because the judges in Calvin’s
64 Study, supra note 2, at 1689 (“[I]n a century of case law since the Insular Cases, ‘no fed-
eral court ha[d] recognized birthright citizenship as a guarantee in unincorporated territories’”
(quoting Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 95 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d 788 F.3d 300)).
65 See Calvin’s Case (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398; 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 18a.
66 See infra notes 80–116 and accompanying text.
67 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 306 (1901) (White, J., concurring, dictum)
(“Can it be denied that . . . the consequence would be . . . the immediate bestowal of citizen-
ship on those absolutely unfit to receive it?”).
68 See, e.g., Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Politi-
cal Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283, 286 (2007) (“[The Insular Cases’s] skewed outcome
was strongly influenced by racially motivated biases[.]”).
69 BACON, supra note 11, at 218.
70 See id. (noting that Parliament can separate England from alterius dominions by statute
“if we like not their consort”).
71 See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 140 (1904) (remarking, in a case concern-
ing the right to trial by jury in criminal cases in the Philippines, that Congress has expansive
power to enact “needful rules” in newly acquired territories); Downes, 182 U.S. at 306.
72 See BACON, supra note 11, at 218–19.
73 See, e.g., Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 2461 (2016).
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Case rejected the same objection when Sandes made it.74 Although Sandes proposed
granting Scots an intermediate status like the statutory status of American Samoans,
the judges ruled that the common law makes anyone born within the King’s domin-
ions and ligeance natural-born in all of those dominions.75
The fourth objection is that the Founders would not have intended “to extend
birthright citizenship to distinct, significantly self-governing political territories within
the United States’s sphere of sovereignty—even where . . . ultimate governance
remains statutorily vested with the United States Government.”76 This argument fails
because the Founders recognized that the rule applied that way throughout the
King’s dominions.77 Two of the most important reasons for the Revolution were the
colonists’ objections to Parliament asserting ultimate sovereignty over them despite
their independent legislatures, and denying them the rights of natural-born subjects
despite their common allegiance to the same King.78
The fifth argument is that unincorporated territories might gain independence
with impractical consequences.79 This fails because the judges in Calvin’s Case dis-
regarded English objections that dominions united by descent could easily separate
by descent upon a failure of the King’s line.80 Separation does not create practical
difficulties.81 If a territory separates, an individual’s nationality also separates follow-
ing place of birth, absent an agreement for retention or election;82 both the United
States and Britain have rejected contrary dicta in Coke’s report of Calvin’s Case.83
74 See Calvin’s Case, 7 How. St. Tr. at 563–64.
75 See id. at 614–15.
76 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 306.
77 See Adams, IX, supra note 45.
78 See Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress (Oct. 19, 1765), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY
SOURCE BOOK OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1606–1898, *136–39 (William MacDonald ed., 1914).
79 See Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 302, 305 n.6.
80 See, e.g., Calvin’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. at 593–94.
81 See, e.g., Inglis v. Trs. of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 120–21 (1830).
82 See, e.g., Doe v. Acklam (1824), 107 Eng. Rep. 572, 578–79.
83 See, e.g., Inglis, 28 U.S. at 120–21 (separation of American colonies); Doe, 107 Eng.
Rep. at 578–79 (separation of American colonies); In re Stepney Election Petition (Isaacson
v. Durant), (1886) 17 Q.B.D. 54, 59 (separation of the crown of Hanover, specifically rejecting
the dicta in Coke’s report); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, NAT’L ARCHIVES
(Feb. 7, 1786), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0221 [https://perma
.cc/7WH6-SNE9] (separation of American colonies, specifically rejecting the dicta in Coke’s
report). See generally GEORGE CHALMERS, OPINIONS ON INTERESTING SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC
LAW AND COMMERCIAL POLICY; ARISING FROM AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 11–13 (1784)
(concerning separation of American colonies, citing loss of subject status in prior territorial
separations). The Fourteenth Amendment, being merely declaratory of the common law,
should not alter the common law consequences of territorial separation. The effect of sepa-
ration on previously acquired statutory derivative citizenship is less clear. The Stepney court
did not reach the issue because all of the alleged statutory subjects had been born abroad to
Hanoverian parents after the separation of the crown of Hanover. It is unlikely that American
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The sixth argument is that a textual difference in the Thirteenth Amendment’s
use of “jurisdiction” proves that some places (presumably unincorporated territo-
ries) are outside of the United States but subject to its jurisdiction for purposes of
birthright citizenship.84 The Thirteenth Amendment forbids slavery “within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction,”85 whereas the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s citizenship clause applies to persons “born . . . in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”86 This argument mischaracterizes the qualifier
“and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the citizenship clause. The qualifier
means “within the allegiance” thereof.87 Consequently, this argument must be read
to claim that persons born in unincorporated territories are born outside of the United
States and within its allegiance. That is impossible. The citizenship clause is merely
declaratory of the common-law rule under which the only persons born outside of
the United States and within its allegiance are children of ambassadors. The quali-
fier only applies to persons born in the United States, and it functions only to exclude
by the fewest and fittest words children born to foreign ambassadors, to hostile foreign
occupiers, or under Native American allegiance.88
The words “any place” in the Thirteenth Amendment and “within its jurisdic-
tion” in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invoke a different
meaning of “jurisdiction”—the specific geographic reach of governmental authority,
including its extraterritorial reach.89 Recognizing jus soli in unincorporated territo-
ries would not affect the Thirteenth Amendment or the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Their applicability depends on the separate determina-
tion of which express constitutional restrictions on state and federal governments
should apply against territorial governments, discussed further below.
The seventh argument is that the Insular Cases preclude birthright citizenship
in unincorporated territories because they are not destined for statehood.90 This
argument fails because natural-born citizenship is beyond the ambit of the Insular
Cases. Those cases involve specific limitations on powers that the Constitution
statutes in effect before Philippine independence would apply to previously foreign-born
children of parents born there even if courts acknowledge that jus soli applied there, given
Congress’s belief upon enacting those statutes that it did not. If the Supreme Court recognizes
that jus soli applies in the remaining unincorporated territories then a child’s derivative citi-
zenship might survive the parent’s loss of nationality from their separation. Alternatively, it
might follow the parent’s loss given that derivative citizenship is secondary. In any event the
United States and the separating territory could permit retention or an election.
84 See Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 303–04.
85 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
86 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
87 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655 (1898).
88 See id. at 664–65.
89 See Pet. for Cert., supra note 2, at 22 (Thirteenth Amendment and extraterritorial
jurisdiction).
90 See Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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grants to Congress (and, by extension, to powers that Congress delegates to territo-
ries).91 However, the Constitution does not grant Congress any power over natural-
born citizenship; it only gives Congress the authority to naturalize aliens.92 The
common-law rule of natural-born citizenship is not a limitation on congressional
power but rather an organic rule of law imposing a political status that carries with
it obligations as well as rights. It predates the Insular Cases,93 the Civil War amend-
ments,94 the Bill of Rights,95 the adoption of the Constitution,96 and Independence.97
Moreover, as explained below, Congress recognized shortly after the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment that the common-law rule applied in the Oregon Country
during its joint occupation with Britain,98 even though it was unincorporated under
the later-invented standards of the Insular Cases.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OREGON COUNTRY
The Oregon Country was the American name for the disputed lands north of the
forty-second parallel and west of the Rocky Mountains99 that Britain, Russia, Spain
and the United States all claimed. Disputes over the area nearly led to war among
the powers.100 The United States ultimately secured almost all of the territory by
diplomatic means after threats of war.101 Among the most important diplomatic
measures were two treaties with Great Britain.
In 1818 Britain and the United States signed a convention (the “Treaty of 1818”)102
that provided for joint access to (or occupation of) the Oregon Country in order to
prevent a third war between them:
91 See Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic:
The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC
SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 2–11 (Christina Duffy
Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
92 See, e.g., 4 Annals of Cong. 1027 (1794) (statement of James Madison) (noting the
Constitution only grants Congress the power “to admit aliens”).
93 See Appendix.
94 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV (ratified 1866–70).
95 See id. amends I–X (ratified 1791).
96 See id. (ratified 1787).
97 See Perez, supra note 4, at 1051; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S.
1776).
98 See, e.g., McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161, 165 (D. Or. 1871).
99 For a series of maps depicting the areas and extent of American and British claims in
the Oregon Country, see J. Neilson Barry, Oregon Boundaries, 33 OR. HIST. Q. 259, 261,
263, 265, 267 (1932).
100 See CHARLES H. CAREY, A GENERAL HISTORY OF OREGON PRIOR TO 1861, at  52, 56, 66
(1935).
101 See id. at 68 (explaining the treaties with Spain in 1819 and Russia in 1824).
102 See generally Convention with Great Britain, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Oct. 20, 1818.
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It is agreed that any country that may be claimed by either party on
the northwest coast of America, westward of the Stony Mountains,
shall, together with its harbours, bays, and creeks, and the navi-
gation of all rivers within the same, be free and open . . . to the
vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two Powers; it being well
understood that this agreement is not to be construed to the
prejudice of any claim which either of the two high contracting
parties may have to any part of the said country, . . . the only
object of the high contracting parties, in that respect, being to
prevent disputes and differences among themselves.103
The two nations did not occupy the Oregon Country with military forces.104
However, Britain projected its influence through commercial fur trading companies
and their settlements.105 It extended the laws of Upper Canada to the disputed
country and gave the Hudson’s Bay Company a commercial monopoly and the au-
thority to administer justice there as well as the power to make war and peace with
any non-Christian rulers or peoples.106 As a result, some considered the company’s
employees to be de facto British troops.107 The territory that the company occupied
was effectively a semi-feudal state administered by its local head.108
Despite repeated requests by American settlers and resulting proposals in Con-
gress,109 however, the United States did not extend any municipal, civil or criminal laws
to the Oregon Country, not even to the American-occupied areas south of the Columbia
River.110 American settlers relied on frontier justice, Methodist missionaries acting as
magistrates, and the occasional intercession of the Hudson’s Bay Company to govern
the American-occupied area.111 Finally, a combination of American and French-
Canadian settlers established a short-lived government in the American-occupied area
in 1841 that led to a provisional government in 1843.112 The provisional government
103 See, e.g., id. at art. III (with a ten-year limited term). A subsequent treaty extended the
original indefinitely with the right to abrogate on twelve months’ notice. See Convention with
Great Britain, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Aug. 6, 1827, arts. I, II.
104 See WILLIAM LAMBERS, THE ROAD TO PEACE: FROM THE DISARMING OF THE GREAT
LAKES TO THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 21–25 (2004).
105 See CAREY, supra note 100, at 231–32, 237, 375.
106 See id. at 151, 161, 317; HUDSON’S BAY CO., THE ROYAL CHARTER FOR INCORPORATING
THE HUDSON’S BAY COMPANY 15–17 (1816).
107 See, e.g., UNITED STATES, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO
1856 286 (D. Appleton et al. eds., Vol. X 1859) ( December 1828 statement of Rep. Drayton).
108 See CAREY, supra note 100, at 243.
109 See id. at 266, 318.
110 See id. at 317–18 (explaining a petition in 1840, addressed to Congress and from resi-
dents of Willamette Valley, asking for protection against crime, which highlighted the need for
civil and criminal law and the protection of private rights as a more urgent issue).
111 See id. at 317–18.
112 See id. at 318–21, 329–31.
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established its own postal service,113 militia,114 and legal tender115 (which the Constitu-
tion forbids to states).116 Its legitimacy derived from the consent of the governed—it
was created by popular vote, its members were elected by popular vote, and the only
initial consequences of failing to pay its taxes were the loss of suffrage and of the
benefit of its laws.117
The government evolved consensually to encompass British subjects in the area
occupied by the Hudson’s Bay Company.118 Its officials swore to support its laws
to the extent consistent with their duties as U.S. citizens or British subjects.119 Its
1843 organic law120 and 1845 constitution121 expressly provided that they would
only remain in force “until such time as the United States of America extend their
jurisdiction over us.”122
The United States and Britain settled their differences in June 1846, in a con-
vention that fixed the border “between the territories of the United States and those
of Her Britannic Majesty” along the forty-ninth parallel from the Rocky Mountains
to the coast.123 This conceded to the United States the area between the Columbia
River and the forty-ninth parallel that the Hudson’s Bay Company had previously
occupied.124 Congress continued to leave the Oregon Country alone even after settling
the border dispute.125 The provisional government continued to operate, including
organizing a militia in 1847 to respond to a Native American attack on a local mis-
sion.126 After the attack, the provisional government again petitioned Congress to
make territorial appointments and to provide assistance.127
In response, Congress finally organized the Territory of Oregon and a territorial
government for it in August of 1848.128 The legislation extended federal law to the
territory, conferred the rights and obligations of the original Northwest Ordinance
on its residents, and ratified the provisional government’s existing laws other than
113 Id. at 355.
114 Id. at 354.
115 Id.
116 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
117 See CAREY, supra note 100, at 320, 331, 344. Voting was restricted, however, to free
males descended of white males. Id. at 336.
118 See id. at 347–48.
119 See id. at 349.
120 Id. at 336.
121 Stansbery v. First Methodist Episcopal Church, 154 P. 887, 890–91 (Ore. 1916).
122 Id. at 890.
123 See Treaty with Great Britain in Regard to Limits Westward of the Rocky Mountains,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., June 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 869.
124 See id. art III–IV.
125 See Oregon History: Territorial Government, supra note 13.
126 See CAREY, supra note 100, at 358–59.
127 See id. at 359, 466.
128 An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Oregon, ch.177 § 1, 9 Stat. 323, 323
(1848).
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those inconsistent with the Constitution or granting or encumbering land.129 The
provisional government continued to operate until a territorial governor appointed
by President Polk arrived in 1849.130
IV. MCKAY V. CAMPBELL
In 1871, a federal district court adjudicated the citizenship claim of William C.
McKay,131 who was born in 1824 to a British father and a Native American mother
at a Hudson’s Bay Company trading post on the Columbia River.132 A British naval
commander had claimed the post for the crown during the War of 1812133 shortly
after its builder and former owner, an American fur trading company, had sold it to
a predecessor of the Hudson’s Bay Company in anticipation of its imminent cap-
ture.134 The Treaty of Ghent restored the post to the United States after the war,135
and an American official took ceremonial possession of it in 1818 while the British
company continued to operate within it.136 Britain later claimed that it had agreed
in the treaty to cede only the post, not sovereignty over the land.137
In the 1871 decision, District Judge Matthew P. Deady found that the Four-
teenth Amendment “is nothing more than declaratory of the rule of the common-
law” in Calvin’s Case138 and that the common-law rule applied in Oregon at
McKay’s birth.139 He then applied Calvin’s Case in two different ways to determine
McKay’s status.
The first assumed the validity of the American claim to sovereignty over the
entire Oregon Country.140 Under that rationale Deady found that McKay was born
within the United States but not under its jurisdiction.141 “Of course it matters not
whether the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States was excluded from the place
129 Id. § 14, 9 Stat. 323, 329.
130 See CAREY, supra note 100, at 360.
131 16 F. Cas. 161 (D. Or. 1871).
132 See id. at 162. The court dated McKay’s birth in 1823. See id. Historical sources, how-
ever, routinely date it in 1824. See, e.g., JOHN B. HORNER, OREGON: HER HISTORY, HER GREAT
MEN, HER LITERATURE 260 (1919).
133 See CAREY, supra note 100, at 179–80.
134 See id. at 214–15.
135 See id. at 215.
136 See id. at 216.
137 Id. at 217.
138 Id.
139 McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161, 161, 164–65 (D. Or. 1871). The Supreme Court
later agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment was merely declaratory of original constitutional
law. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898).
140 See MacKay, 16 F. Cas. at 161, 164–65.
141 See id. at 164–65.
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of birth of this plaintiff by force of arms or by treaty with Great Britain. The result
is the same in each case.”142
Under this rationale the entire Oregon Country was within the United States for
purposes of birthright citizenship, and the common-law rule from Calvin’s Case
applied throughout.143 Even in the British-occupied area any children born to parents
adhering to the United States would have received birthright American citizenship
either immediately or upon the United States’ occupation in 1846.144 However, it
appears that there were no such children because the Hudson’s Bay Company
exclusively occupied the area that it controlled until eight Americans moved north
of the Columbia River in 1845.145
Deady’s second application of Calvin’s Case focused on the unique language
of the Treaty of 1818 to find that the treaty divided Oregon’s soil by parentage. “As
to the British subject and his children born here, the country was for the time being
British soil, while to the American citizen and his offspring it was in the same sense
American soil.”146 McKay was not a citizen under this rationale either, because the
soil followed the father and his father was British.147 He would not have been a
citizen if the soil followed the mother, because his mother was Native American.148
Although McKay lost his case,149 the decision confirmed that the common-law
rule applied to confer birthright American citizenship in some or all of Oregon from
1818 to 1846.150 Judge Deady acknowledged that the law left many Oregon residents
as aliens because of their births to British fathers and Native American mothers.151 But
he insisted that “[t]he remedy, if any is deemed necessary, is with the legislature,
and not the courts.”152 Congress accepted the challenge in 1872 and reversed the
result of the case.153 The legislative history and the terms of the resulting statute
confirm that the entire Oregon Country was American soil within the United States
for purposes of birthright citizenship during its joint occupation.154
142 Id. at 165.
143 See id. at 162.
144 See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682 (excluding only children of the occupying force
from birthright citizenship); Inglis v. Trs. of Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. 99, 156 (1830)
(Story, J., dissenting) (receipt by a kind of “postliminy” upon subsequent reoccupation).
145 See Henry Commager, England and Oregon Treaty of 1846, 28 OR. HIST. Q. 18, 20
(1927).
146 McKay, 16 F. Cas. at 164.
147 See id. at 165.
148 See id. at 166.
149 See id. at 167.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 Id.
153 See CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 2nd Sess., 1177 (1872).
154 See id. at 2640.
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V. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Oregon Senator Corbett introduced a naturalization bill in 1872.155 The reported
debates are from the Senate. Every Senator who discussed the bill agreed that persons
born within the Oregon Country and subject to U.S. jurisdiction during the joint
occupation were birthright citizens.156 The Constitution requires nothing more than
U.S. title to territory and birth there, other than to foreign ambassadors, to hostile
foreign occupiers, or under Native American allegiance.
An example is the exchange between two Senators who were well-aware of
Oregon,157 Allen G. Thurman (former Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court)158
and Lyman Trumbull (chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, co-author of the
Thirteenth Amendment, and former Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court)159:
Mr. THURMAN. I should like to inquire how it is that persons
born in what is now the State of Oregon, and who were subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States when born, are not citi-
zens of the United States without any act of Congress?
Mr. TRUMBULL. I think they are, and I cannot see the necessity
for this bill, except that we are informed by the Senator from
Oregon that the courts in Oregon have decided that persons born
upon that strip of country which was in dispute between the
United States and Great Britain prior to the treaty which settled
the boundary line which we claimed, and which was afterward
awarded to us, are not citizens of the United States.160
155 See id. at 1177.
156 See id. at 1175–76.
157 See, e.g., Rep. Allen G. Thurman, Speech of Mr. Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, on the
Oregon Question (Jan. 28, 1846) (transcript of speech by then-Representative Thurman con-
cerning separation of powers and power to annul a treaty with Great Britain over the status
of the Oregon Country); THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS
17 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958) (describing Trumbull’s views on opposing statehood for Oregon
due to insufficient population). Senator Thurman’s speech shows that by the time the United
States was willing to press for a final border settlement in 1846 there was significant con-
gressional support for extending U.S. law and protection to Oregon but also continuing fear
that doing so would lead to ruinous war with Britain. See Thurman, supra, at 9–10.
158 See Thurman, Allen Granberry (1813–1895), Biographical Directory of the United States
Congress (1774–Present), http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=t000251
(last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
159 See David B. Kopel, Lyman Trumbull: Author of the Thirteenth Amendment, Author of
the Civil Rights Act, and the First Second Amendment Lawyer, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1117, 1119
(2016); Trumbull, Lyman (1813–1896), Biographical Directory of the United States Congress
(1774–Present), http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=t000392.
160 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 2640 (1872). Notably, neither the act organizing
the Territory of Oregon nor the act admitting Oregon to statehood naturalized persons
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Senator Corbett clarified that the decision was by a federal district court and
applied to those born in the British-occupied area between the Columbia River and
the forty-ninth parallel.161 Before Corbett could explain the judge’s technical
reasoning, Thurman derided the decision as “absurd”162 because he could only imagine
that the judge had based his decision on the theory that the United States did not
own that area:
As long as it depends upon the decision of some judge who does
not understand what he is about, it is a trifling matter; but for
the Congress of the United States to say that we did not own that
territory between the Columbia river and the forty-ninth parallel,
and that we have to naturalize the people who were born upon
it and were subject to our jurisdiction, for the Congress of the
United States to say that, is a pretty serious matter.163
Senator Casserly, a lawyer and former corporation counsel for the City of New
York,164 objected for the same reason:
I do not wish, unless it is unavoidable, to object to a bill which
is desired by the Senator from Oregon, and which respects that
State; but the question involved here is whether or not the
United States for a series of years set up a false and unfounded
title to territory, and whether it shall now be declared by acts of
Congress to have been false and unfounded. I would rather have
it laid over until some time when the question can be fully
discussed.165
Senator Kelly then explained the common-law grounds of the District Court
decision:
Both held the territory in common; it was a joint occupation,
and in order to be a citizen of the United States he must have
previously born there even though Americans had lived in Oregon for decades prior to ad-
mission. See id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See Casserly, Eugene (1820–1883), Biographical Directory of the United States
Congress (1774–Present), http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=c000236
[https://perma.cc/6E33-WXC7] (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
165 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 2796 (1872).
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been not only born within the United States, but born within the
allegiance of the United States. The child of a British minister
born in this city . . . is born in the United States, but he is born
without the allegiance of the United States; and so it was there
in Oregon.166
He further explained that “[t]here is no question that those who were born of
American parents were American citizens; but the class to which this bill refers are
the children of British subjects, born after the treaty of 1818 and before the treaty
of 1846.”167 Senator Corbett also advised that the only purpose of the bill was to
make those born in the occupied area conceded to the United States in 1846 “citi-
zens the same as other persons born in that territory[.]”168 He avoided further debate
on whether the proposal was necessary by using a procedural device while Senator
Casserly was off the Senate floor.169
Senator Trumbull, who did not consider the bill necessary, supported it as a favor
to his Oregon colleague. Eliciting laughter from the Senate, he said “I thought that the
enactment of the law could do no great harm, and it seemed to be a great gratification
to the Senator from Oregon.”170 Trumbull apparently did ensure that the final statute
expressed Congress’s understanding that the British-occupied area was within the
United States for purposes of birthright citizenship.171 The original bill did not so
provide.172 The Senate Judiciary Committee (which Trumbull chaired) amended the
bill to confirm that those who were born in the British-occupied area and remained
in the United States were citizens “in the same manner as if born elsewhere in the
United States” (rather than in that foreign-occupied part of the United States).173
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 2816.
170 Id. at 2640.
171 Act of May 18, 1872, 17 Stat. Ch. 172, § 3, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., in THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF THE U.S.A. 134 (George P. Sanger ed., 1872).
172 For the original bill’s preamble and operative provision, see CONG. GLOBE, 42nd
Cong., 2nd Sess., 2639 (1872).
173 Id. The terms of the final statute were generic and did not refer to the British-occupied
area. They read: “That all persons born in the district of country formerly known as the Territory
of Oregon, and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at this time, are citizens of the
United States in the same manner as if born elsewhere in the United States.” Act of May 18,
1872, 17 Stat. Ch. 172, § 3, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., in THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE U.S.A.
134 (George P. Sanger ed., 1872). The generic language has led one scholar to conclude that
the statute extended the Fourteenth Amendment to Oregon by treating birth there as “tanta-
mount to birth in the United States.” CHARLES R. VENATOR-SANTIAGO, PUERTO RICO AND THE
ORIGINS OF US GLOBAL EMPIRE: THE DISEMBODIED SHADE 36 (2015). As the legislative history
demonstrates, however, the common-law rule as declared in the Fourteenth Amendment
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All of the Senators who discussed the bill agreed that birth within the Oregon
Country and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States conferred birthright
citizenship,174 and Congress enacted a statute recognizing that the entire Oregon
Country was within the United States for that purpose.175 This occurred only four
years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment176 and demonstrates what
that declaratory amendment and the original Constitution recognize as being within the
United States and subject to its jurisdiction for purposes of birthright citizenship.177
Whether the statute was necessary is an interesting but academic question.
Perhaps the Hudson’s Bay Company was a de facto hostile occupying force. Or
perhaps the hostile occupation rule extends to commercial occupation permitted to
avoid war. Regardless, the Oregon precedent demonstrates that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is merely declaratory of the common-law rule, which conferred birthright citi-
zenship in the Oregon Country from 1818 to 1846.
VI. THE UNINCORPORATED OREGON COUNTRY
The Supreme Court has identified several standards to determine whether a
territory is incorporated, including the extension of federal laws and the Northwest Ordi-
nance to it,178 treaty provisions requiring incorporation,179 and express declarations
of Congress.180 The Oregon Country did not meet any of these standards at McKay’s
birth.181 Congress did not extend federal law or the Northwest Ordinance to Oregon
already applied in Oregon at McKay’s birth. The statute merely naturalized those like him
who had been born in the British-occupied area to British fathers, a fact that earlier writers
had observed. See, e.g., W. L. Hill, The Doctrine of Natural Allegiance, 21 AM. L. REG. 69, 79
(Mitchell, et al. eds., 1873); B. C. MOON, THE REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM THE COURTS OF THE
SEVERAL STATES TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 302–03 (1901). Judge Deady
noted but rejected “a vague public opinion” in Oregon that persons like McKay had received
elective American citizenship “by remaining south of the forty-ninth parallel after the treaty
of 1846[.]” McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161, 167 (D. Ore. 1871).
174 See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 2639–40 (1872).
175 Act of May 18, 1872, 17 Stat. Ch. 172, § 3, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., in THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF THE U.S.A. 134 (George P. Sanger ed., 1872).
176 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (enacted July 9, 1868).
177 Judge Deady’s interpretation of the Treaty of 1818 was certainly wrong. The United
States claimed exclusive title to the entire Oregon Country. See, e.g., Thurman, supra note
157, at 3. The treaty expressly disclaimed any prejudice to either party’s claims to any part of
the country. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. Therefore the treaty could not have
affected jus soli citizenship under U.S. law.
178 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 269 (1901).
179 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922).
180 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309; Downes, 182 U.S. at 269.
181 See McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161, 162–63 (D. Ore. 1871). In fact, at the time
of McKay’s birth, some considered the Oregon Country to be a “desert waste,” “unsettled
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until 1848; the Treaty of 1818 did not require incorporation;182 and Congress did not
declare before 1824 that Oregon was incorporated or would become a state.
The Court has also distinguished sparsely populated and easily accessible
territories that offer American citizens the opportunity for immigration and settle-
ment, which are more likely to be considered incorporated by implication, from
those like Puerto Rico that are less accessible and are already populated.183 This
factor does not support the incorporation of the Oregon Country either. At the time
of McKay’s birth “there was no public demand for further territorial expansion”
into Oregon, which was remote, almost uncharted, and located beyond an interven-
ing territory that had not yet been settled.184 Congress believed that Oregon was too
far away and too likely to separate into its own republic to become or remain a
state.185 Moreover, Congress discouraged American emigration to Oregon by refusing
to provide land grants or to promise statehood.186
Finally, one of the most important reasons that Congress originally refused to
extend federal law to Oregon was that the territory was not destined for statehood.187
Many members of Congress expected Oregon to become an independent republic,188
a commercial and military base or colony,189 or a district reserved for non-whites to
and obscure,” and not worth fighting over. Id. at 163.
182 See Oregon History: Territorial Government, supra note 13; supra note 103 and ac-
companying text.
183 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309–10.
184 See CAREY, supra note 100, at 431.
185 See, e.g., 1 REGISTER OF THE DEBATES IN CONGRESS, COMPRISING THE LEADING DEBATES
AND INCIDENTS OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 14 (Gale & Seaton
eds., 1825) [hereinafter REGISTER] (statement of Rep. John Floyd) (voicing the “generally
adopted” opinion in Congress, with which Rep. Floyd disagreed) (Dec. 20, 1824); id. at 38
(statement of Rep. Alexander Smyth) (“If we open, on the western coast, a fertile country, offer-
ing temptations to emigrants from among us—it will carry off many of our enterprizing [sic]
and valuable people . . . until it will drop off and become a separate nation.”); id. at 692 (state-
ment of Sen. Mahlon Dickerson) (complaining of distance, inaccessibility, and, supposing with
certainty that “when it shall obtain the strength and importance of a state, [it] will fall off from
the Union by its own weight.”) (Feb. 26, 1825). But see, e.g., id. at 14–18 (statement of Rep.
John Floyd) (offering counter-arguments and willingness to allow separation into an indepen-
dent nation).
186 Cf. id. at 38 (statement of Rep. Alexander Smyth) (“[L]et not our citizens be invited
to that country by grants of land, or the expectation of a state government being established
there”); id. at 26–27 (statement of Rep. Daniel P. Cook) (deriding proposal to grant land to
settlers as “calculated to delude the people of this country, enterprizing [sic] as they are . . . from
their present peaceful abodes”). Late in the joint occupation and in anticipation of war,
British officers scouting land routes for troops to invade Oregon reported that American
soldiers accompanied a group of emigrants on their way to Oregon, ostensibly to protect them
from Native Americans, but by implication to scout troop routes instead.
187 See REGISTER, supra note 185, at 690.
188 See id. at 213 (statement of Rep. James B. Reynolds).
189 See id. at 713 (statement of Sen. Thomas H. Benton).
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“live under governments of their own, suited to their circumstances,”190 perhaps
allied with the United States or under its protection but in no way part of a homoge-
neous white confederacy in the east.191
Senator Dickerson, for example, denied in 1825 that Oregon was destined for
statehood: “But is this territory of Oregon ever to become a state, a member of this
Union? Never. The Union is already too extensive—and we must make three or four
new states from the territories already formed.”192 For Dickerson, the consequences
of that fact were significant.
First, acquiring the territory imposed no affirmative obligations on the United
States.193 “It is true, that, by the operation of certain causes, we have acquired this ter-
ritory; but that circumstance surely imposes upon Congress no obligation to provide for
its occupation or population, unless the interests of the United States should require
it. To that country we owe nothing.”194 Second, the acquisition imposed a negative
obligation—the obligation not to extend federal law to the territory so as to make
it a colony.195 Senator Dickerson firmly resisted colonialism in opposing a proposal
to erect military fortifications in the territory and to extend U.S. revenue laws there:
As yet, we have extended our laws to no territories, but such as
were or are to become states of the Union. We have not adopted
a system of colonization, and it is to be hoped we never shall.
Oregon can never be one of the United States. If we extend our
laws to it, we must consider it as a colony.196
Senator Benton also denied that Oregon would ever become a state,197 but he sup-
ported the proposal for strategic military and commercial purposes.198 He did not care
what use the nation made of Oregon besides statehood—“whether we shall hold it as a
military post and naval station, settle it as a colony, or found a new Republic upon
it”199—as long as the United States prevented further growth of Britain’s monarchical
power there.200 Senator Dickerson’s impassioned opposition to colonialism and a fear
of provoking Britain carried the day; the Senate rejected the proposal.201 Despite
continuing requests from American settlers,202 Congress did not extend federal law
190 Id. at 37–38 (statement of Rep. Alexander Smyth).
191 See id.
192 Id. at 691.
193 See id. at 689.
194 Id.
195 See id. at 690.
196 Id. at 689–90.
197 See id. at 711–12.
198 See id. at 709–11 (reciting five specified advantages).
199 Id. at 713.
200 See id.
201 See CAREY, supra note 100, at 258.
202 See id. at 318.
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to the Oregon Country until 1848 when it also promised statehood by conferring the
rights and obligations of the original Northwest Ordinance on its residents.203
The non-incorporation of Oregon illustrates a fundamental problem with in-
ferring territorial incorporation from treaty provisions.204 Treaties of cession referred
to the incorporation of inhabitants, not territories.205 Spain ceded its Oregon claim to
the United States in the same treaty in which it ceded Florida in 1819.206 The treaty
required that “[t]he Inhabitants of the territories which His Catholic Majesty cedes to
the United-States . . . shall be incorporated in the Union of the United-States[.]”207
The provision applied only to inhabitants, not the territory, and it was bilateral; it
did not require the United States to incorporate Oregon into the Union contrary to
its standstill obligations to Britain under the Treaty of 1818,208 let alone to incorpo-
rate British inhabitants into the Union.209
The Oregon precedent demonstrates that the declaratory Fourteenth Amendment
and the original Constitution recognize birthright citizenship in unincorporated
territories even if the United States does not exercise its jurisdiction there.
VII. OREGON AND THE INSULAR TERRITORIES
The commonly accepted narrative of the Insular Cases210 is that the territories
acquired in 1898 differed radically from the nation’s earlier continental territo-
ries.211 Earlier territories were close, easily accessible, coveted for the growth and
settlement of the white American population, and destined for statehood.212 The
203 See 30th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 177.
204 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 339 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he treaty-
making power cannot incorporate territory into the United States without the express or
implied consent of Congress”).
205 See, e.g., Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., art. III Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat.
200 (“The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United
States.”).
206 See Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
207 Id. at art. VI.
208 See id.
209 Nor could the Treaty of Amity have required the incorporation of Oregon and its Russian
inhabitants. The United States and Russia did not settle their conflicting claims until 1824. See
CAREY, supra note 100, at 258. The foregoing is not intended to acknowledge the validity
of the territorial incorporation doctrine or the Insular Cases’s appropriation of the term
“incorporation.” Instead it suggests that the treaty record indicates that any doctrine of in-
corporation is properly limited to the personal incorporation of ante-nati, with organic U.S. law
governing the status of post-nati.
210 See Appendix.
211 See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922).
212 See, e.g., id.; Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases Into the Canon of Consti-
tutional Law, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND
THE CONSTITUTION 126 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
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United States only acquired territories with the intent to grant statehood to them and
citizenship to their people.213
By 1898, however, the nation had grown enough.214 The territories acquired
from Spain were too far away to be part of the United States proper.215 Further ex-
pansion served the purpose of power, not growth;216 Puerto Rico was coveted for
its strategic commercial and military advantages, not for whites’ living space.217 It
is not even clear that America owes those territories protection and a republican
form of government.218 The doctrine of territorial incorporation accommodated this
difference and made American colonialism possible.219
The Oregon precedent belies this narrative.220 The United States acquired
Oregon without congressional intent to make it a state.221 Many in Congress consid-
ered it to be too distant and inaccessible to become a state.222 Some thought that the
United States had already grown enough by the time of McKay’s birth, and Con-
gress discouraged American emigration there.223 Senator Benton coveted Oregon
for its strategic commercial and military value, and Senator Dickerson denied that
the United States owed anything to it.224 Rep. Smyth asked a fundamental question
213 Tauber, supra note 62, at 147.
214 See Burnett & Marshall, supra note 91, at 27.
215 See Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest Destiny: Conquest, Race, and the Insular Cases,
in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 158 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
216 See E. Robert Statham, Jr., U.S. Territorial Expansion: Extended Republicanism versus
Hyperextended Expansionism, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EX-
PANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 175 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
217 See Perea, supra note 215, at 163.
218 See Levinson, supra note 212, at 125 (asking a series of unanswered questions left open
by Puerto Rico’s legal status).
219 See José A. Cabranes, Some Common Ground, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE:
PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 43 (Christina Duffy Burnett
& Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
220 See supra Part III.
221 Nor are the insular territories distinguishable because acquired by war. Cf. Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138, 140 (1904) (“[T]he United States may acquire territory in the exercise of
the treaty-making power by direct cession as the result of war, and in making effectual the terms
of peace; and for that purpose has the powers of other sovereign nations.”). Spain ceded its
significantly older Oregon claim after the United States invaded Spanish Florida and captured
Spanish forts there. See ROBERT P. WETTEMAN, JR., PRIVILEGE VS. EQUALITY: CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA, 1815–1845, xvi (2009) (offering chronology of the U.S.
invasion); Treaty of Amity, supra note 206, Art. III (ceding Spanish claim to Oregon). The
United States relied on the Spanish cession to defend its title against the competing British and
Russian claims. See REGISTER, supra note 185, at 38 (statement of Rep. Alexander Smyth)
(“We have succeeded to the claim of Spain, who held by the right of first discovery.”); id. at 688
(statement of Sen. James Barbour) (“Spain, under whom we claim, has . . . the best title.”).
222 See REGISTER, supra note 185, at 689–90.
223 See Burnett & Marshall, supra note 91, at 27.
224 REGISTER, supra note 185, at 689.
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in 1824 that Congress has continued to grapple with since 1898: “Where shall the . . .
limits of the United States be fixed? I do not mean the limits of their territory, or the
extent of their power. We may have establishments on distant shores; but where
shall the limits of the states, the members of this confederacy, be fixed?”225
American colonialism was possible at McKay’s birth without a doctrine of terri-
torial incorporation. The United States might have colonized Oregon absent Dickerson’s
impassioned opposition—the House of Representatives had already approved a
version of the bill that he defeated.226 The narrative that the United States had never
acquired a territory without intending to make it a state is incorrect.227 Rather, the
United States did not extend its laws to Oregon until it was to become a state.228
What remains of the Insular Cases is their barely covert narrative of racism in gen-
eral229 and Anglo-Saxon juridical ethnocentrism in particular,230 which cannot support
the continuing colonization of unincorporated territories.231
CONCLUSION
The Constitution confers natural-born citizenship in unincorporated territories
even if the United States does not actually exercise its jurisdiction there. The Four-
teenth Amendment’s qualifier “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof”232 merely
“exclude[s], by the fewest and fittest words”233 the three classes of children who do
not receive citizenship by birth: those born to foreign diplomats, to hostile foreign
occupiers, or under Native American allegiance. This conclusion is a matter of law,
not politics. It follows from centuries of English and American precedents that allow
both shared birthright citizenship and independent, organic self-government.
Whether the United States should colonize unincorporated territories by extending
its laws to them is a separate question. It is a matter of politics, not law.234 To answer
that question we must rely on the nation’s founding principles, which utterly reject
225 Id. at 37.
226 See REGISTER, supra note 185, at 58–59.
227 Contra Cabranes, supra note 219, at 43.
228 See REGISTER, supra note 185, at 690 (statement of Senator Dickerson on withholding
of federal law when Oregon was not destined for statehood); supra note 204 and accompa-
nying text (joint extension of federal law and the Northwest Ordinance to Oregon).
229 See Perea, supra note 215, at 155–62.
230 See Mark S. Weiner, Teutonic Constitutionalism: The Role of Ethno-Juridical Discourse
in the Spanish-American War, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN
EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
231 See id.
232 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
233 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 682 (1898) (interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment, which the Court recognized was declaratory of the common law). 
234 See Cabranes, supra note 219, at 41–43 (noting Puerto Rico’s desire for political au-
tonomy and self-government).
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treating U.S. territories as Britain treated the American colonies.235 If territories are
not destined for statehood, Congress should repeal statutes that extend federal law
to them, including organic acts that delegate federal governmental powers. The terri-
tories could then constitute (or reconstitute) their own organic governments. Those
governments would derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed, not
from Congress or from any connection to prior sovereigns.
The territories would not be states, so they would not be subject to constitu-
tional restrictions on states. They would not operate under a delegation of authority
from Congress, so they would not be subject to constitutional limitations on the
federal government.236 What constitutional restrictions might be incorporated against
them and under what interpretive theory remains to be determined (and may differ
from those that the Insular Cases identify). Some restrictions like the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition on slavery would certainly apply.237 Others would not, or
would not apply with the same rigor as they do against states.
The Supreme Court recently claimed in dicta that territories cannot organize their
own governments without congressional permission.238 However, the authority that
the Court relies on does not support the claim, and the Oregon precedent contradicts
it.239 Congress tolerated Oregon’s self-government during the joint occupation and
235 Cf. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); Thomas Jefferson’s Reply to the
Representations of Affairs in America by British Newspapers (Before Nov. 20, 1784) (“It
would be difficult to find one man among [American soldiers] who would not consider a return
under the dominion of Gr[eat] Br[itain] as the greatest of all possible miseries.”).
236 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence applying equal protection limitations to unincorpo-
rated territories’ governments is not coherent. It sometimes relies on federal statutory law, in-
terpreting statutory restrictions on states to apply to unincorporated territories. See, e.g.,
Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572(1976). It cannot determine whether the Fifth
or the Fourteenth Amendments impose equal protection obligations on them. See id. Given that
unincorporated territories are neither states for constitutional purposes nor destined for state-
hood, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause should not apply to them. The
Fifth Amendment should apply only to the extent Congress exercises or delegates its power to
them. Cf. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (“The Constitution of the United
States is in force in Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that
government is exerted.”).
237 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312 (recognizing that the Constitution protects fundamental
personal rights in unincorporated territories). 
238 See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2016) (citing Simms v.
Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899)).
239 The cited portion of Simms held that Congress has sovereignty over territories and applied
a statute in which Congress had exercised its authority. See Simms, 175 U.S. at 168. The Simms
Court did not consider whether a territory could create its own organic law if Congress declined
to exercise its jurisdiction there. See also Walt Crowley, American Settlers in Oregon Declare
a Provisional Government on May 2, 1843 (Feb. 19, 2003), http://www.historylink.org/File
/5248 [https://perma.cc/JE3Z-MBAC] (explaining that Oregon’s first convening of its legisla-
ture occurred in 1844, the British ceded its claims in 1846, and in 1848, Oregon became a
Territory of the United States).
2018] OTHER LANDS AND OTHER SKIES 427
for two years afterward, and when it organized the Territory of Oregon it ratified all
of the provisional government’s laws that were consistent with the Constitution and
did not grant or encumber land.240
The Constitution authorizes but does not require Congress to govern territories,241
and America’s founding principles forbid Congress to exercise its jurisdiction over
those that are not destined for statehood.242 If Congress does not exercise its jurisdic-
tion then the people of the territories have the right to form their own governments.
Congress and those governments could then determine the future relationship between
the states and the territories. It might be a confederation. It might be permanent or
ultimately lead to statehood or independence. But in the meantime it would not be
colonialism, and persons born in any state or territory would be bound together by
shared birthright American citizenship.
240 See State of Oregon Law Library, Oregon Courts Under the Territorial Government,
https://soll.libguides.com/c.php?g=519356 [https://perma.cc/59ZB-SQ2Y].
241 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
242 See REGISTER, supra note 185, at 690.
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APPENDIX
The classification and interpretation of the Insular Cases is somewhat controversial.
What follows is a summary of the Insular Cases prepared by the Editors of the
Journal. The author does not endorse the views expressed in it.
The Insular Cases are a set of cases decided between 1901 and 1922 that set out the
constitutional posture of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, and other
territories. See Perez, supra note 4, at 1034 n.13. There is no fixed definition of the
Insular Cases. See, e.g., Hon. Juan R. Torruella, One Hundred Years of Solitude:
Puerto Rico’s American Century, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO,
AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 243 (Christina Duffy Burnett &
Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (defining the Insular Cases as eight cases relating to the
1898 Treaty of Paris); Hon. José Trías Monge, Injustice According to Law: The
Insular Cases and Other Oddities, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO,
AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 239 (Christina Duffy Burnett &
Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (naming ten cases the author defines as comprising the
Insular Cases); Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonial-
ism: The Insular Cases (1901–1922), 65 REVISTA JURÍDICA U.P.R. 225 (1996)
(describing the import and impact of about twenty “Insular Cases” from 1901 to 1922).
A broad definition of the Insular Cases generally includes: Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922) (holding unanimously that, although Puerto Rican persons
were U.S. citizens, they were not entitled to the full ambit of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions); Ocampo v. United States, 234
U.S. 91 (1914) (upholding a Manila city ordinance that denied accused arrestees a
“preliminary investigation” for a finding of probable cause for arrest, despite the
ordinance apparently violating the Philippines Declaration of Rights); Ochoa v.
Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913) (holding that the military governor of
Puerto Rico violated the Due Process rights of property owners when he retroac-
tively reduced the period for adverse possession of real property from twenty years
to six years); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911) (holding, among other
things, that the Fifth Amendment requirement that capital and “infamous” crimes
be presented by indictment has no effect in the Philippines); New York ex rel.
Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909) (holding that the governor of Puerto Rico
had the authority to demand extradition from New York of an accused fugitive);
Kent v. Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907) (holding the U.S. Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a Puerto Rico embezzlement conviction where the
defendant alleged the island’s judicial districts were illegally organized and where
defendant alleged a supposed confession was neither authenticated nor shown to be
taken voluntarily); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907) (reversing a U.S.
Army Private’s conviction for homicide in Philippines civil court in a case where
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the defendant had admitted to the killing, where defendant had already been acquit-
ted by a court martial); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905) (upholding
Philippines Supreme Court summarily enhancing defendant’s conviction for assault
to homicide, even when defendant had at trial been acquitted of premeditated murder);
Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (reversing an Alaska Territory
defendant’s conviction for “keeping of a disreputable house” because a six-person
jury was constitutionally deficient, and, after lengthy discussion, concluding that the
Sixth Amendment applied to the Alaska Territory), abrogated by Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970); Mendezona y Mendezona v. United States, 195 U.S. 158 (1904)
(reversing a criminal conviction on double jeopardy grounds where defendant had
been acquitted at trial but then summarily held guilty by the Philippines Supreme
Court); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (reversing an embezzlement
conviction on double jeopardy grounds, which are discussed at length, where defen-
dant had been acquitted at trial but summarily convicted by the Philippines Supreme
Court); Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904) (ordering the release of a Puerto
Rican woman from immigration detention because, as a Puerto Rican person, she was
not an “immigrant”); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (holding, among other
things, that the constitutional right to trial by jury did not extend to the Philippines);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (upholding a Hawaii Territory defendant’s
conviction for manslaughter where the grand jury could not agree on an indictment
and the trial jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, because the Sixth Amendment
was not “fundamental” and the process conformed to earlier practices in Hawaii);
Pepke v. United States (The Diamond Rings Case), 183 U.S. 176 (1901) (reversing sei-
zure of diamond rings shipped from Philippines to Chicago because the Philippines
was a U.S. territory and therefore import duties did not apply); Dooley v. United
States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901) (finding Congress had taken no action to incorporate
Puerto Rico); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901) (upholding tariffs im-
posed by the U.S. military governor on goods shipped from states to Puerto Rico prior
to the signing of the peace treaty with Spain). See also Efrén Rivera Ramos, Decons-
tructing Colonialism: The “Unincorporated Territory” as a Category of Domination,
in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 104, 105 n.4 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
